Radio frequency identification (RFID) chips have been widely deployed in large-scale systems such as inventory control and supply chain management. While RFID technology has much advantage, however it may create new problems to privacy. Tag untraceability is a significant concern that needs to be addressed in deploying RFID-based system.
Introduction
RFID [4] and NFC [9] are the de-facto technology for storing small amount of data on devices that can be read without physical contact. It is expected that everyday objects will be tagged with small components which are used to carry information to identify the object. For example, the garnment industry plans to use RFID tags for the management of post-sale services. Obviously, it is expected that encryption is used for storing information on the tag so that only legitimate users can access the stored data. Encryption though does not solve all problems and we are interested in privacy issues associated with RFID tags. Specifically, RFID tags can be read by anyone and the string stored on a tag, even though it is a ciphertext, can be used to trace the tag and, in the case the tag is attached to a personal object, to trace the owner of the tag.
We thus envision a system in which the environment helps in alleviating this problem: as tags move in the environment they are read by special devices called the randomizers which provide the following service: everytime a randomizer reads a tag carrying a ciphertext, the ciphertext is rerandomized; that is, a new ciphertext carrying the same cleartext is computed. This can be easily achieved if the randomizers are trusted with the secret keys: just decrypt the ciphertext to obtain the cleartext and then encrypt the cleartext using fresh randomness. In some applications though this is a very strong trust assumption: even if one of the randomizers is corrupted then all privacy is lost. We thus look at the problem of designing special encryption schemes that support re-randomization; that is, given a ciphertext Ct carrying cleartext M , it is possible to produce a new ciphertext Ct carrying the same cleartext M , even if the decryption key is not available.
The El-Gamal encryption scheme. A simple variation of the El-Gamal encryption scheme is known to be re-randomizable [5] , but it is of limited applicability. Let us review the re-randomizable version of the ElGamal encryption scheme.
Let p be a large prime and let g be a generator of Z p . The public key for the ElGamal encryption scheme consists simply of an element y ∈ Z p and the associated secret key is x ∈ Z p such that y = g x (all operations are in Z p ). In the encryption scheme rElGamal (the re-randomizable version of the ElGamal encryption scheme), to encrypt message M ∈ Z p , one selects r, s ∈ Z p at random and computes the pair (g r , M y r , g s , y s ). The plaintext associated to ciphertext Ct = (C 0 , C 1 , U 0 , U 1 ) is recovered by computing C 1 /C x 0 , where x is the secret key. The re-randomization procedure takes a ciphertext Ct = (C 0 , C 1 , U 0 , U 1 ), selects t, t ∈ Z p at random and returns
. It is easy to see that if Ct is a ciphertext for cleartext M then Ct is a uniformly distributed ciphertext for the same cleartext M . Also notice that the re-randomization procedure does not need to know neither the public key nor the secret key associated with the ciphertext Ct.
Suppose now that we want to store message M on a tag and suppose we use rElGamal to encrypt M before actually storing on the tag. Unfortunately, an adversary A that wants to trace a tag has a very simple and successful strategy. A simply generates a pair of public/secret key (y A , x A ) for rElGamal and writes a random message M A on the tag T A that he wants to trace by computing ciphertext Ct A for public key y A . Notice that everytime T A is re-randomized by the randomizers, message M A is not affected. Thus to check that a given tag T is actually T A , A can simply try to decrypt the stored ciphertext and if the decryption gives back M A then with very high probability A can conclude that he is in presence of T A .
We notice that rElGamal can still be used in the scenario in which writing on the tag can be selectively disabled by the owner. That is, the owner of the tag enables writing on the tag when in presence of trusted randomizers and disables writing if he is in an untrusted environment.
The scenario. In this paper, we consider the more challenging scenario in which writing on a tag cannot be selectively disabled. Obviously, in this scenario, an adversary A can destroy the content of a tag T by overwriting its content. We will guarantee though that A cannot trace tag T even in this case.
We have three types of honest players:
1. The Central Authority CA that publishes some public information Pub and issues a pair of private and secret keys to each authorized player.
2. The players that receive a public and secret key from the CA and use the keys to encrypt and decrypt messages that are stored on tags.
3. The randomizers that receive tags and randomize the ciphertexts stored on the tags. The randomization procedure changes the ciphertext but not the cleartext stored on the tag.
Notice that the role of the CA is necessary: if users could generate keys by themselves then the it would not be possible to prevent attacks similar to the one we have discussed for the rElGamal encryption scheme. In this paper we give a construction for untraceable tags. We split the presentation in two parts. In Section 4 we present a tag system that is secure against adversaries that can only read tags. Building on the construction of Section 4, in Section 5 we present out main result, a tag system that is secure against adversaries that can write on tags.
Previous work. In [1] , a construction for an untraceable tag system was proposed. The security of the construction of [1] is based on a stronger version of the LRSW assumption introduced by Lysyanskaya et al. [6] . The strong LRSW assumption does not hold for symmetric bilinear mapping. Specifically, the construction of [1] requires the existence of three groups G 1 , G 2 , G T such that no morphism between G 1 and G 2 exists and of a bilinear mapping e : G 1 × G 2 → G T . This is called the asymmetric bilinear setting. If one tries to use the construction of [1] in the symmetric bilinear setting then, as it is easily seen, tags become traceable. Our construction instead is in the symmetric bilinear setting. In [1] the authors state that in the full version of their paper they will show a construction of the symmetric bilinear setting. To the best of our knowledge such a full version was never published.
Moreover, our construction is based on a mild assumption in the sense of [2] . That is our assumption is tautological in the generic group model [11] and is "efficiently falsifiable" [8] in the sense that its problem instances are stated non-interactively and concisely (i.e., independently of the number of adversarial queries and other large quantities). In contrast, the assumption used to prove the security of the construction in [1] is stated in an interactive way.
The model
We start by defining the notion of a tag system and then define its security properties. We consider quintuples of algorithms (GenPub, GenKey, rEnc, rDec, Randomize) with the following intended meaning.
1. GenPub(1 k ) is executed by the CA. It takes as input the security parameter k and returns the public information Pub, the randomizing information rPub, and the master secret key Msk.
2. GenKey(Pub, Msk) is executed by the CA to generate the secret key of a player. It takes as input the public information Pub and the master secret key Msk and returns the public key Pk and the secret key Sk.
3. rEnc(Pub, Pk, M) is executed by a player to encrypt a message M to be written on a tag. It takes as input the public information Pub, the public key Pk of the user for which the message is encrypted, and the message M and returns the ciphertext Ct.
4. rDec(Pub, Sk, Ct) is executed by a player to decrypt a ciphertext Ct. It takes as input the public information Pub, the secret key Sk of the user, and the cipheretext Ct and returns the cleartext M.
5. Randomize(Pub, rPub, Ct) is executed by the randomizers to randomize ciphertexts. It takes as input the public information Pub, the randomizing information rPub, and a ciphertext Ct that encrypts a message M for public key Pk and returns a new ciphertext Ct that encrypts message M for Pk. We stress that M, Pk, and the secret key Sk are not given as input to Randomize.
In a typical scenario, the players are manufacturers that attach tags to consumer goods. They obtain their pair of private and secret key from the CA and use the encryption algorithm rEnc to store information regarding the good on the tag. We envision randomizers being present in the physical environment were the end user lives. Finally, the decryption algorithm rDec is used by the manufacturer to recover the information written on the tag when the end user requires assistance (or maintenance) from the manufacturer.
Definition 2.1 A tag system is a quintuple of algorithms (GenPub, GenKey, rEnc, rDec, Randomize) such that for any = poly(k),
We next define the security properties of a tag system. We start from semantic security.
Semantic security
Consider the following experiment with an adversary A.
3. Run A on input Pub and Pk and obtain messages M 0 , M 1 . 4. Toss a random coin η ∈ {0, 1} and compute Ct = rEnc(Pub, Pk, M η ). 5. Run A on input Ct and let η be its output. 6. If η = η then return 1 else return 0.
In SSExp A the adversary A selects two strings of his choice, M 0 and M 1 . Then, one of the strings is picked at random, it is encrypted and given to the adversary. We require that the adversary is not able to guess which of the two string has been encrypted. Definition 2.2 A tag system (GenPub, GenKey, rEnc, rDec, Randomize) is semantically secure if for all probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms A we have that
is negligible in k.
Weak untraceability
Next we define the notions of untraceability for a tag systems. We start with the notion of weak untraceability and then present our notion of strong untraceability.
For defining the notion of weak untraceability we use the following experiment.
3. Run A on input Pub, Pk 0 and Pk 1 and obtain
Toss a random coin η ∈ {0, 1} and compute Ct = Randomize(Pub, rPub, Ct η ). 6. Run A on input Ct 0 , Ct 1 , Ct and let η be its output. 7. If η = η then return 1 else return 0.
In WUExp A the adversary A selects two strings of his choice, M 0 and M 1 . Both strings are encryped using different public keys (namely, Pk 0 and Pk 1 ) obtaining the ciphertexts Ct 0 and Ct 1 , respectively. Then, one of the ciphertexts is picked at random, it is re-randomized and given to the adversary along with Ct 0 and Ct 1 . We require that the adversary is not able to guess which of the two ciphertexts (i.e, tags) has been re-randomized. Definition 2.3 A tag system (GenPub, GenKey, rEnc, rDec, Randomize) is weakly untraceable if for all probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms A we have that
We remark that weak untraceability protects against adversaries that can only read tags and not write on tags. Thus it is a very weak notion and cannot be applied to our scenario of interest. In Section 4 we will give a construction of a weakly untraceable tag system which constitutes the basis for our construction of a strongly untraceable tag system.
Strong untraceability
Next we define the notion of a strongly untraceable tag system and for this we need the following experiment. Essentially in SUExp A the adversary A selects two strings of his choice, Ct 0 and Ct 1 . Then both strings are re-randomized and, if the procedure is successful on both of them, then one is picked at random and given to the adversary. We require that the adversary is not able to guess which of the two tags has been re-randomized. Notice that if the adversary selects the two strings so that the randomization procedure fails (that is, it outputs the special failure symbol ⊥) on exactly one of them, then traceability is unavoidable. We disallow this case by having the experiment return 0 (meaning that the adversary failed).
Observe also that the two strings Ct 0 and Ct 1 need not to be well-formed ciphertexts with respect to Pk but still the randomization procedure could be successful. However that if they both are well-formed ciphertexts then we are actually executing experiment WUExp A . This implies that strong untraceability is stronger than weak untraceability (as one would expect).
Definition 2.4 A tag system (GenPub, GenKey, rEnc, rDec, Randomize) is strongly untraceable if for all probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms A we have that
Strong semantic security
We observe that the notion of semantic security does not make any security guarantee with respect to randomizers. In other words, randomizers are assumed to be trusted. If this is the case, then we have a very simple and direct construction of strongly untraceable tag systems. Roughly speaking, the randomizer decrypts the ciphertext and re-encrypts it using fresh randomness. If instead randomizers cannot be assumed to be trustful, then we require semantic security to hold also with respect to randomizers.
3. Run A on input Pub, Pk and rPub and obtain messages M 0 , M 1 . 4. Toss a random coin η ∈ {0, 1} and compute Ct = rEnc(Pub, Pk, M η ). 5. Run A on input Ct and rPub and let η be its output. 6. If η = η then return 1 else return 0.
Experiment SSSExp A differs from SSExp A in that in the former the adversary is given access to the re-randomizing information rPub and so it correctly models security against randomizers. Definition 2.5 A tag system (GenPub, GenKey, rEnc, rDec, Randomize) is strongly semantic secure if for all probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms A we have that
Finally, we have Definition 2.6 A quintuple of algorithms (GenPub, GenKey, rEnc, rDec, Randomize) is an untraceable tag system if it is strongly untraceable and strongly semantic secure.
Background on bilinear groups
The symmetric bilinear setting. We have multiplicative groups G and G T of prime order p and a non-degenerate pairing function e :
That is, for all g ∈ G, e(g, g) = 1 and e(g a , g b ) = e(g, g) ab . We denote by g and e(g, g) generators of G and G T , respectively. We call a symmetric bilinear instance a tuple I = [p, G, G T , g, e] and assume that there exists an efficient generation procedure G that, on input 1 k , outputs an instance with |p| = Θ(k).
In our constructions we make the following hardness assumptions.
Bilinear Decision Diffie-Hellman Given a tuple [I, g z 1 , g z 2 , g z 3 , Z] for random exponents z 1 , z 2 , z 3 ∈ Z p it is hard to distinguish between Z = e(g, g) z 1 z 2 z 3 and a random Z from G T . More specifically, for an algorithm A we define experiment BDDHExp A as follows. 
Decision Linear. Given a tuple [g z 1 , g z 2 , g z 1 z 3 , g z 2 z 4 , Z] for random random exponents z 1 , z 2 , z 3 , z 4 ∈ Z p it is hard to distinguish between Z = g z 3 +z 4 and a random Z from G. More specifically, for an algorithm A we define experiment DLExp A as follows.
running G with with security parameter 1 k ; 02. Choose z 1 , z 2 , z 3 , z 4 ∈ Z p at random; 03. Choose η ∈ {0, 1} at random; 04. if η = 1 then choose z ∈ Z p at random 05.
else set z = z 3 + z 4 ; 06. Set Z 1 = g z 1 , Z 2 = g z 2 , Z 13 = g z 1 z 3 , Z 24 = g z 2 z 4 , and Z = g z ; 07. Let η = A(I, Z 1 , Z 2 , Z 13 , Z 24 , Z); 08. if η = η then return 1 else return 0; 
Note that Symmetric Decision Linear implies Symmetric Decision BDDH and the Symmentric Decision Linear assumption has been used in [2] .
A first construction
In this section we present our construction of a tag system Tag = (GenPub, GenKey, rEnc, rDec, Randomize) and then we show that it is semantically secure and weakly untraceable.
The construction
Procedure GenPub(1 k ). We now describe the procedure GenPub used by CA to generate the public information Pub, the re-randomizing information rPub and the master secret key Msk.
1. Run G(1 k ) to select a random bilinear instance I = [p, G, G T , g, e] with |p| = Θ(k). 2. Pick t 1 , t 2 , t 3 , ω, ∈ Z p and g 0 , g 1 ∈ G at random.
4. Set Pub = I, g 0 , g 1 , Ω, T 1 , T 2 , T 3 , rPub = ∅, and Msk = (t 1 , t 2 , t 3 , w).
Return [Pub, rPub, Msk].
Procedure GenKey(Pub, Msk). We now describe the procedure used by CA to generate the pair of public and secret key. 1. Pick r ∈ Z p at random. 2. Set Pk = g 0 g r 1 .
3. Set
Set
Procedure rEnc(Pub, Pk, M). We first describe the basic encryption procedure E(Pub, Pk, M) that takes as input the public parameters Pub, the public key Pk, and a cleartext M ∈ G T . Then, we describe the randomizable encryption procedure rEnc in terms of E. E(Pub, Pk, M) is computed by picking s, s 1 , s 2 ∈ Z p at random and setting
We will use the writing C = E(Pub, Pk, M; s, s 1 , s 2 ) to denote the ciphertext computed using s, s 1 and s 2 as random choices. rEnc(Pub, Pk, M) simply computes C = E(Pub, Pk, M) and U = E(Pub, Pk, 1) and returns [C, U ].
Procedure rDec(Pub, Sk, Ct). As for the encryption procedure we first describe the basic decryption procedure D(Pub, Sk, C).
Simple algebra shows that if, (Pk, Sk) are a pair of public and secret keys output by GenKey(Pub, Msk) and C = E(Pub, Pk, M) then D(Pub, Sk, C) = M. Indeed, we notice that
and thus
Hence,
The randomizable decryption algorithm rDec(Pub, Sk, Ct) with Ct = [C, U ] simply returns D(Pub, Sk, C).
Procedure Randomize(Pub, rPub, Ct). We now describe procedure Randomize used to randomize a ciphertext. A ciphertext Ct = [C, U ] for key Pk is composed of a basic encryption C of M ∈ G T and of a basic encryption U of 1 ∈ G T . Notice that C · U (component-wise multiplication) is a new valid basic encryption of M w.r.t. key Pk. Moreover let U = [U , U 0 , U 1 , U 2 , U 3 ] be a basic encryption of 1 w.r.t. key Pk. Then, for random r, r 3 , r 2 ∈ Z p ,
is a randomly distributed encryption of 1 w.r.t. the same key. Therefore, to randomize Ct = (C, U ) we compute ( C, U ) where C = C · U and U = (U ) ; that is, we apply the randomization of U twice and use the intermediate result U to randomize C. Notice that we do not need to know the public key for which C is intended.
Semantic security
In this section we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1 Assume the BDDH assumption. Then tag system Tag is semantically secure.
Proof. Suppose that there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A for which
for some polynomial poly. Then, the following probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm B breaks BDDH.
1. B receives the tuple [I, g z 1 , g z 2 , g z 3 , Z], for random z 1 , z 2 , z 3 , and has to decide whether Z = e(g, g) z 1 z 2 z 3 or Z is random in G T .
2. B picks x, y, t 1 , t 2 , t 3 ∈ Z p at random and sets
and Pk = g 0 g x 1 . After this step Pub and Msk are implicitly defined. Indeed, Ω = e(Z 1 , Z 2 ) t 1 t 2 t 3 implictly sets ω = z 1 z 2 . Notice that Pub has the same distribution as the public information given as output by GenPub(1 k ). Moreover, setting Pk = g 0 g x 1 implies that Pk is a random element of G as g 0 g x 1 = g y .
3. B runs A on input Pub and Pk and receives M 0 , M 1 . Then, B picks b ∈ {0, 1} and s 1 , s 2 ∈ Z p at random and computes
where U is a random encryption of 1 for Pk and receives b as output.
Observe that if Z = e(g, g) z 1 z 2 z 3 we have that C = E(Pub, Pk, M b ; z 3 , s 1 , s 2 ). Indeed, we have
. Therefore A will guess b correctly with probability at least 1/2 + 1/poly(k), On the other hand, if Z is random then C is independent of b and thus A will guess b correctly with probability at most 1/2. This implies that B breaks the BDDH assumption. 
Weak untraceability
To prove weak untraceability we show that under the Decision Linear assumption, if we apply the randomization procedure to any ciphertext Ct = [C, U ] we obtain a tuple that is indistinguishable from a random tuple chosen
We observe that it is actually enough to prove that for any basic encryption
We proceed in two steps.
The first step. We prove that the following two distributions are indistinguishable under the BDDH. For any M ∈ G T , define distribution Dist 0 (1 k ) as follows:
while, distribution Dist 1 (1 k ) is defined as follows:
In the definition of Dist 1 we have denoted by Ω, T 1 , T 2 , T 3 the components of Pub and by U , U 0 , U 1 , U 2 , U 3 the components of U . Notice that if we write U as U = E(Pub, Pk, 1; s, s 1 , s 2 ) then we have
That is, U is a ciphertext for a random element of G T for public key Pk (specifically, U is an encryption of Ω rs −rs ). Thus, indistinguishability of Dist 0 and Dist 1 can be argued by a reasoning similar to the one employed to prove semantic security.
The second step. We prove that, under the Decision Linear assumption, distributions
] : (Pub, U, U )} and
are indistinguishable. Notice that Dist 2 is just a re-writing of Dist 1 and that Dist 3 is the random distribution on G T × G × G × G × G. Thus, the second step completes the proof that U is indistinguishable from a random quintuple. Suppose for sake of contradiction that there exists a probabilistic polynomialtime adversary A that can distinguish Dist 2 from Dist 3 . That is, denoted with p A 2 (k) and p A 3 (k) the probabilities that A outputs 1 on input a random tuple from Dist 2 (k) and Dist 3 (k) respectively, we have that
for some polynomial poly. Then the following probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm B breaks the Decision Linear assumption.
1. B receives the tuple [I, g z 1 , g z 2 , g z 1 z 3 , g z 2 z 4 , Z], for random exponents z 1 , z 2 , z 3 ∈ Z p , and has to decide whether Z = g z 3 +z 4 or Z is random in G.
B constructs
Pub by picking g 0 , g 1 at random from G, Ω at random from G T , and setting
3. B picks Pk at random from G, and s, s , r 2 , r 3 at random from Z p . B
In this section we present a transformation that takes the weakly intraceable tag system Tag = (GenPub, GenKey, rEnc, rDec, Randomize) of the previous section and tranforms it into a strongly untraceable tag system STag = (SGenPub, SGenKey, SrEnc, SrDec, SRandomize).
The transformation
Our transformation employs a regular semantically-secure encryption scheme E = (KG, Enc, Dec).
Procedure SGenPub(1 k ). Execute procedure GenPub(1 k ) and obtain [Pub, ∅, Msk]. Then, execute the key-generation procedure KG of the secure encryption scheme E and obtain (rpk, rsk). The output of the procedure is the triple [SPub, SrPub, SMsk] where SPub = (Pub, rpk), SrPub = rsk, and SMsk = Msk.
Procedure SGenKey(SPub, SMsk). The key generation procedure takes as input the public information SPub = (Pub, rpk) and the master secret key SMsk = Msk, invokes GenKey(Pub, Msk) to obtain [Pk, Sk], and returns [Pk, Sk].
Procedure SrEnc(SPub, Pk, M). The encryption procedure SrEnc takes as input the public information SPub = (Pub, rpk), the public key Pk, and a cleartext M, invokes 1 E(Pub, Pk, M) to obtain C, and returns the ciphertext Ct = [C, Enc(Pk, rpk)].
Procedure SrDec(Pub, Sk, Ct). The decryption procedure SrDec takes as input the public information SPub = (Pub, rpk), the private key Sk, and the ciphertext Ct = [C 0 , C 1 ] and returns 2 D(Pub, Sk, C 0 ).
Procedure SRandomize(SPub, SrPub, Ct). The randomization procedure SRandomize takes as input the public information SPub = (Pub, rpk), the randomizing information SrPub = rsk, and the ciphertext Ct = [C 0 , C 1 ] and proceeds as follows.
Performances Analysis
In this section, we present the results of some experiments that we ran to evaluate the real applicability and the lightness of our schemes for untraceable tags. We also compare them with the scheme presented in [1] . For our experiments, we set up the following small test-bed:
• PC: Intel Core 2 Quad Q6600 2.40 GHz, 3 GB RAM.
• OS: Ubuntu 9.04 -kernel 2.6.28-11-generic -64 bit.
• PBC Library ver. 0.4.18 [10] .
• dcrypt Library ver. 0.3 [3] .
In the following tables we summarize the results of our experiments. The second column (e.g., Weak) corresponds to the scheme presented in Section 4.1; the third column (e.g., Strong) presents the results for the scheme satisfying the strong untraceability property (the scheme is described in Section 5.1); while, the last column (e.g., InsEnc) describes the results attained by the Insubvertible Encryption scheme proposed in [1] . For the tests, we set the security parameter to k = 1206. Tests were repeated 5000 times. We took the time needed to execute each procedure of an untraceable tag system. In Table 1 we report the average time (expressed in milliseconds) taken by the tests we ran. Considering the randomization procedure, in spite of relying on weaker assumptions, our strong scheme has a better performance, in terms of computational requirements, than the scheme presented in [1] . Our randomization procedure (as well as the decryption one) runs twice faster as the one of [1] . This is very important, as the randomization procedure is invoked quite often (e.g., each time a tag is in proximity of a randomizer); while, all other procedures are invoked just once. Moreover, the randomization procedure is run by special devices (i.e., randomizers) which have low computing power; while, the other procedures are executed by more powerful devices.
Weak
Strong InsEnc Bytes written on tag 1520 1281 364 Table 2 : Size in bytes of the encryption As one can see from Table 2 , both our schemes generate an encrypted message (to be written on the tag) of size greater than the one generated by the scheme in [1] . This is not a big concern, as our encrypted messages easily fit in the user memory of currently produced passive RFID tags. For instance, Maxell provides RFID tags whose memory capacity ranges from 128 bytes up to 4K bytes [7] . Moreover, there exists passive RFID having user memory of 32K bytes [12] .
Extensions and an open problem
Our construction of STag is a special case of a general construction that starts from a randomizable anonymous identity-based encryption scheme that enjoys a weak form of security (specifically, security against randomly chosen identities) and turns into an untraceable tag system. Unfortunately, no randomizable anonymous identity-based encryption was known prior to our work, and thus we had to construct our own.
The strong untraceability property defined in this paper does not give any guarantee against randomizers as in experiment SUExp adversary A has not access to rPub. It would be nice to give a construction which guarantees untraceability against randomizers and whose security is based on mild assumptions.
Nonetheless, as it is not difficult to see, if we use tag system STag, randomizers cannot distinguish between tags carrying encryptions computed with respect to the same public key. This is a very important property since in many applications the public key corresponds to the manufacturer of the object to which the tag is attached. An adversary thus does not need to look at the tag to distinguish objects from different manufacturers and the applicability of tag system STag is not limited.
